The Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires had a similar geographic distribution with outposts all around the Indian Ocean, which they controlled and manned. Both empires faced the same problem of monitoring their agents in remote corners of the world. Each, however, arrived at a different solution to the monitoring problem. I use a principal-agent model to link different monitoring options to the different organizational structures of the two empires. I further investigate the implications of the model with archival data on labor compensation for Portuguese and Dutch workers overseas.
Introduction
Recruiting the "right" people to risky ventures that cannot easily be supervised has always been a challenge. The problem was ever more present in sixteenth century Europe with the establishment of overseas trade empires, which attracted individuals with non-seasonal salaries but mostly with potential opportunities to make fortune.
In this paper I explore the incentive structures across merchant empires controlled by di¤erent parties. In Portugal merchants worked for the king and were therefore less invested in the outcome of the venture, monitoring workers less. In the merchant-controlled Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, henceforth VOC) on the contrary, workers were more closely monitored. These di¤erences have stark theoretical implications from Principal-Agent theory, which is appropriate in the context of merchant empires since the owners of the enterprise (principals) and the workers (agents) are far removed from each other. Because worker's e¤ort is di¢ cult to observe, the principal can induce it by linking performance and pay according to the monitoring strategy in place: closely monitored workers have easily observable performance and receive a ‡at wage (low powered incentives); for workers subject to less monitoring, e¤ort is harder to assess so they receive other forms of compensation beyond wage (high powered incentives).
The paper is an extension of previous work on the origins of the di¤erent control structures in merchant empires (Rei 2011) . The diverse monitoring strategies result from the prior choice of organizational form and are therefore exogenous in the context of this paper. The current model highlights the di¤erences in the structure of labor compensation of overseas workers conditional on the king/merchant control structure, but it does not explain the choice of monitoring levels. Four hundred years after the fact, it is di¢ cult to identify the monitoring intensities of merchant empires. Surviving documents often provide a picture of what happened instead of a description of how it happened. To shed some light on the matter, I constructed a novel dataset on the labor compensation of Portuguese and Dutch overseas workers from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. On average, Portugal paid a smaller portion of compensation in the form of wages than the VOC, allowing therefore for greater opportunities to exploit one's position and fortune making. 1 This evidence is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis described above. I further investigate if the di¤erent wage policies were associated with observable worker characteristics that might have a¤ected monitoring abilities, such as location, occupation and/or rank. Although monitoring is likely to have di¤ered among workers of di¤erent rank, working for the king of Portugal still meant receiving lower wage shares. 2 There is an extensive theoretical literature on incentives to generate e¤ort. 3 The use of bonuses in non-linear compensation schemes has been analyzed in the context of performance standards (Murphy 2000 4 The time lag of the commercial cycle meant that the high degree of autonomy of both the Portuguese viceroy and the Dutch governor-general was unavoidable, which made e¢ cient monitoring a matter of the utmost importance.
Both empires encountered similar challenges regarding the recruiting of personnel. Workers endured perilous voyages to Asia, facing a non-negligible probability of dying either from shipwreck or disease, only to meet more uncertainty and risk upon arrival. 5 The Eastern destinations were often stricken by military con ‡ict and ravaged by disease. Consequently, the compensation package had to provide a premium for overseas location, skill, and risk, as well as incentives for e¤ort. These workers would e¤ectively run the distant empire on the spot, while the owner of the enterprise remained safely in Europe.
The recruitment of workers in the merchant-controlled VOC followed a standard business approach. Family connections might have been relevant but prior information on prospective workers was unclear. Close monitoring would evaluate worker's e¤ort after hiring, which eliminated the need for term contracts. In Portugal, most workers were selected from a 4 Technological innovations in the sailing ship, the workhorse of long-distance trade, were largely irrelevant (North 1968) . 5 In Vasco Da Gama's 1498 voyage roughly two-thirds of the crew succumbed to scurvy (Sanceau 1967 ).
pool of royal servants of the traditional nobility. 6 Candidates could also come from the royal court, which included prominent bourgeois as well as local wealthy merchants who had rendered notable service to the king, such as helping in the discoveries. 7 Even though the king of Portugal chose potentially loyal workers, he was not oblivious to possible moral hazard problems likely to occur in distant territories and when dealing with valuable products.
Thus, labor contracts were limited to three years "lest by a longer term, [workers] might become too powerful and consequently insubordinate to the crown" (Morris 1904:222) .
Loyalty to the crown was not necessarily the most desirable worker quality from a business point of view, but to the king it was. 8 Portugal's personnel policy di¤ered from that of the Netherlands' in terms of monitoring, not because the king was naïve, but because his objectives did not square with best business practices making all investments, including monitoring, costlier. Like merchants, monarchs cared for pro…t but unlike them they also cared for glory and recognition (Rei 2011 ). This latter component ultimately led to di¤erent business decisions across merchant empires, suggesting very di¤erent ventures despite their apparent similarities.
In this light, both monitoring schemes were optimal responses to each controlling party's incentives, exogenous in the current setting. The next section o¤ers a principal-agent model linking monitoring to the type of compensation package o¤ered to overseas workers. 6 In a system where indivisible estates were inherited by the eldest son, the surplus of younger un-landed male siblings inclined to military training had little mercantile interest and engaged in trade through the use of skilled intermediaries (Subrahmanyam 1993:52) . 7 For example Fernão Gomes, a Lisbon merchant who conducted the private operation of Portuguese trade and discovery between 1469 and 1474, while paying rent to the crown. The discovery of gold in 1471 granted Gomes'knighthood. In 1474, the king reassumed control and formally admitted Gomes into the nobility with a new coat of arms. Later, Gomes became a member of the royal council (Barros 1988:67) . Full admission into the nobility however, was not an alternative incentive for worker's e¤ort since most workers already belonged to the traditional nobility. Moreover, Gomes'case was quite exceptional, not only for the quality of his services, but also because he was not a royal worker at the time. Such extraordinary and uncommon reward can be regarded as hiring a potential competitor. Regular rewards consisted of job posts in the East with the corresponding opportunities to make fortune. 8 The recipient of the job might even not have been the originally targeted individual: often, the daughter of a deserving nobleman received from the king an o¢ ce for her dowry (Pearson 1987:64) .
The Principal, located in Europe, manages a company owned by the king or the merchants.
Among other tasks, the principal is in charge of designing labor contracts that induce workers' e¤ort, and is risk-neutral in income. The Agent is hired in Europe to work in Asia, is riskaverse in income, and has preferences u(w) a with u 0 > 0, u 00 < 0.
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The agent can exert e¤ort or not, a = f1; 0g. Either action is unobservable by the principal, who delegates monitoring in exchange for a signal indicating whether the agent is diligent ( 1 ) or not ( 0 ). 10 Better monitoring costs more. The principal prefers an agent who works (a = 1), whereas the agent prefers to shirk (a = 0). The distribution of signal values depends on the agent's e¤ort choice: if a = 1 (a = 0), 1 ( 0 ) arrives with probability p (q < p) and 0 ( 1 ) with probability 1 p (1 q). The precision of the signal -monitoring cost -is given by = p q. Larger implies a more informative, but also costlier, signal.
The principal ties the agent's payo¤ to the observed signal: w 1 if 1 , and w 0 otherwise.
Conditional on the information structure , the principal minimizes the expected labor compensation cost subject to the agent's incentive and participation constraints:
The (binding) incentive constraint can be rewritten as u(w 1 ) = 1 + u(w 0 ), 9 It is di¢ cult to imagine risk-averse people selecting into employment in the other side of the world. Circa 1600, however, outside options were not great. An overseas job could be the opportunity to make a fortune and gain social status. 10 In the standard principal-agent model pro…t is a possible measure of performance to which the principal may tie the agent's payo¤. In this paper I separate pro…tability from the information structure, hence the signal notation. The results do not depend on this speci…cation. the less informative the signal, the larger the payo¤ dispersion. In the two-state model the contract is determined entirely by the two constraints, both of which bind. The result is:
Poor monitoring (low ) increases the gap between payo¤s associated with good (w 1 ) and bad signals (w 0 ). If we interpret w 0 as the wage, and w 1 w 0 as the compensation beyond wage, then the wage share of total compensation becomes
, where v(:) = u 1 (:).
Since v(:) is increasing, the wage share rises in . The predictions of the model are straightforward: better information leads to more reliance on wages or low powered incentives, which imply lower expected compensation. Thus, while high values of minimize compensation costs, they are also more onerous since securing better information on workers is more expensive. In the less e¢ cient organization, the principal earns a lower return from every investment, including monitoring, and therefore makes less use of it. The optimal labor contract will therefore o¤er a lower wage share of total compensation, an implication that can be assessed in the data.
Data
The Portuguese data were extracted from a manuscript from ca. 1582 addressed to the king of Spain shortly after Portugal's transfer of independence in 1580 (Luz 1960 ). The document -whose anonymous author was probably a former high secretary of state -seems to …ll the purpose of providing information about the conditions of the newly acquired eastern empire.
As a consequence, the data are a summary of almost one hundred years of Portuguese operations rather than representative of 1582 alone. With the exception of the island of Ternate (now Indonesia), the Portuguese strongholds in the East remained intact since the 1520s -the last decade of conquests in Asia.
The document has seventeen chapters each corresponding to a speci…c outpost from Sofala (now Mozambique), to Ternate, and also Macao (China). 11 A typical chapter starts with a detailed description of the location and is followed by the list of all its job positions with corresponding wage paid by the king of Portugal and the amount of above wage income allowed. 12 The seventeen chapters provide the complete set of job positions of European o¢ cials (e.g. captains, factors, scribes) across all locations (e.g. Goa, Ormuz, Timor) of the Portuguese empire. There are 198 observations. 13 Labor compensation has two components: a yearly …xed wage paid by the Royal Treasury and a supplemental income to which Portuguese o¢ cials were entitled for the term of the contract. This extra income could take the form of privileges attached to a certain post (e.g. imports of spices, intra-Asian trade); gifts and payments from local jurisdictions (often extorted); or …nancial advantages attached to the position such as lending money or providing supplies in the areas of jurisdiction. The size of this income beyond wage depended on local conditions (e.g. war, agricultural year) but also on the o¢ cial's ability to make use of the position. Some locations (e.g. Ternate) are mentioned to have yielded higher amounts in the past, but such was no longer the case due to war, or because current workers were not diligent enough. In sum, non-wage income was dependent on the empire's maintenance and performance, both of which relied on worker's e¤ort.
The Dutch data were collected from a detailed historical study of the VOC's personnel (Lequin 1982) . In particular, the study provides complete records for 115 workers who spent 11 See Figure 2 for a detailed map of the Portuguese and Dutch trading centers in the data. 12 In the preface, Luz notes that the description of job posts and their compensation is not merely statistical. There are often comments on the current values associated with a given location or occupation. The author also adds his own critical opinion on as diverse issues as territorial defense, or the nomination of personnel. Such statements help to understand the adverse circumstances the faced in the East, as well as the management and personnel practices of the empire. 13 Workers in the Portuguese eastern empire were very likely more than 198. However, locally hired labor (e.g. to load and unload ships) is not in the data, which also does not contain Portuguese workers selected for o¢ ce under the patronage of high rank o¢ cials, such as city captains (Pearson 1987:64) .
at least some time in Bengal between 1669 and 1799, one year before the dissolution of the company. Among other characteristics, from the date of entry to that of exit, I observe worker's location, occupation, date of promotion, total wage payments (similar to the wage component in the Portuguese package), and total value accrued beyond wage (similar to the supplemental income in the Portuguese package).
14 Like the Portuguese, all Dutch workers in the sample were hired in their home country. 15 The two datasets di¤er in that the Portuguese covers job posts over three-year periods, whereas the Dutch presents individual careers lasting twenty-two years on average. The di¤erent contract duration however, is not necessarily dictating the observed incentive structure: longer terms may have allowed workers greater fortune-making possibilities, reducing the need for large incentives; on the other hand however, these workers were exposed to eastern dangers (war and disease) for longer periods, so they might have required more incentives to take such jobs. As such, both datasets provide total career compensation (even if careers have di¤erent lengths) divided in wage and above wage income and therefore allowing for cross-country comparisons. Table 1 shows the wage shares of total compensation for Portuguese and Dutch workers. To account for the possibility that the Netherlands, the late entrant, may have learned from Portugal's mistakes and adjusted wage shares upward, I divided Dutch workers in two groups according to the date of entry (before and after 1724). If better monitoring techniques became available, Dutch compensation would have shifted towards larger wage shares in a later stage. 16 The last two columns of Table 1 reveal the opposite pattern.
Dutch workers entering the VOC after 1724 have lower wage shares of compensation than workers entering before that year: the older the Dutch company, the closer the compensation structure becomes to the Portuguese. This phenomenon may be associated with the decline of the VOC, but it does not seem to endorse Dutch learning from Portuguese mistakes.
Alternative Hypotheses and Results
The data allow for the analysis of variables other than organizational control, which could potentially a¤ect the compensation structure. Di¤erent monitoring strategies, and consequently wage shares, could plausibly result from di¤erences in worker's location, occupation or rank according to the following hypotheses:
H 1 workers in spice-producing locations, such as Indonesia, may have been easier to monitor than workers in locations with less tangible outcomes such as the administrative cities of Goa and Bengal, or relatively less proli…c spice locations in the Malabar Coast (Southwest India), or even strategic locations like the Cape of Good Hope. To account for these di¤erences, I divided locations into Indonesia and Other Regions; H 2 workers in the civil sector may have been easier to monitor than workers at sea or in the military as they were less mobile and arguably had fewer smuggling opportunities. I divided occupations into sectors of activity -Civil, Sea, and Military;
H 3 low-rank jobs may have encompassed simpler tasks, which would have been easier to monitor. Based on the …rm's hierarchy provided in each document, every occupation above the middle was classi…ed as High-rank and below as Low-rank.
17 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Dutch variables report workers'location, sector, and rank for more than 50% of the career. 18 The majority of the observations are located 16 The result is identical if the date of exit (and not entry) is taken into account. 17 The hierarchies of both empires are similar and available from the author upon request. 18 Start and ending variables vary considerably: most Dutch workers arrived in Batavia but ended their in India, which is driven mainly by Portuguese workers. Both samples consist of workers mainly in the civil sector, and both have 64% of the workers in a low-rank job.
The following regression tests all variables possibly a¤ecting compensation structure: Given the patterns in Table 1 we would expect a negative correlation between the wage share and a …rm controlled by the crown, 1 < 0. The Location, Sector and Rank hypotheses lead us to expect 2 > 0 for all H i .
The …rst three columns in Table 3 H 3 ) , on the other hand, cannot be rejected due to signi…cant 3 : Portuguese civil servants and low-rank workers seem to have received larger wage shares than Dutch workers not in the civil sector or in high-rank positions.
The fourth column in Table 3 includes all explanatory variables and cross products.
careers in Bengal; 64% started in the civil sector and almost all (97%) end there; career progress in the VOC was very clear -90% of the workers started in low-rank positions but only 36% are last observed as such. These di¤erences do not change the results.
Again 1 is negative and highly signi…cant even after controlling for all possible alternatives a¤ecting the wage share. The Sector hypothesis is no longer veri…ed but the Low-rank coe¢ cient remains signi…cant, if summed with 1 indicates that, on average, Portugal paid a wage share of compensation 32:9% lower than the Netherlands. 19 The lower Dutch shares could be associated with the way in which the data were constructed. Worker's location, sector and rank are attributed to the place, industry or category where workers spent more than 50% of their careers. The problem exists if the initial 30%
of Dutch careers were spent in low-wage locations/sectors/rank, while in the remaining 70% the reverse occurred. The classi…cation criterion would only capture the latter part of the Dutch careers, "helping" the model. If the pattern was similar for Portuguese workers (of which I only capture one contract) then the model fully explains the arti…cial result.
The last two columns in Table 3 demystify this conjecture. First, the only signi…cant explanatory variable in the Dutch regression is that of the civil sector but since it is negative, Dutch civil servants were associated with lower wage shares and not the opposite as H 2 suggests. 20 Second, for Portuguese workers the only signi…cant variable is Low-rank, which is associated with higher wage shares; even though 64% of Portuguese workers belong to this category, their wage shares are still lower than the Dutch.
Concluding Remarks
I use a principal-agent model to illustrate di¤erences in the compensation structures of Portuguese and Dutch overseas workers from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. In the case of poor worker information, the model predicts lower wage fractions of total compensation so that there is a stronger incentive to work hard. This theoretical result matches the observed historical evidence: on average Portuguese royal servants were paid lower wage 19 There are thirty-nine workers with zero wages, all of them Portuguese, which makes wj wj +zj zero for a non-trivial number of observations (12%). Tobit estimations yield similar results to the reported OLS. 20 Given that only 3% of Dutch workers were not civil servants, the negative coe¢ cient probably says more about the omitted workers.
shares than Dutch VOC workers, which is consistent with a scenario in which Portuguese workers were monitored less since it was costlier.
Portuguese overseas positions were e¤ectively rewards for prior services and acknowledged opportunities to make fortune from the large fractions of income beyond wages. Dutch workers also received a notable component of compensation in this form, but it was signi…cantly smaller than the Portuguese counterpart, a result which holds even after controlling for alternative explanations that may have a¤ected wage shares, such as worker's location, sector, and rank.
The historical evidence on labor compensation indicates distinct worker incentives according to the control structure, suggesting the Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires were very di¤erent enterprises even though they traded in similar products and regions. Significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
